Showing posts with label Economy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Economy. Show all posts

Thursday, March 20, 2008

Malcolm’s Economics 101 tutorial


MALCOLM Turnbull has managed an impressive trifecta today, getting boxed around the ears by not just Wayne Swan, but also Treasury secretary Ken Henry and Reserve Bank governor Glenn Stevens.

The first bloke, Swan, has not proved an overly strong match to date for Turnbull’s intelligence, drive and burning ambition.

The second and third players, Henry and Stevens, may prove more difficult to rumble. And that’s good news for Swan, who is still finding his feet as Treasurer and now has some powerful ammunition to tackle his opponent’s claimed economic credentials.

For Henry and Stevens, today was the day they decided to hold a little Economics 101 tutorial for Turnbull, without naming him, whether he likes it or not.

First up, Turnbull was pulled into line over his repeated claims in parliament that cabinet ignored Treasury advice to nominate a specific increase to the minimum wage in its submission to the Fair Pay Commission.

“Everyone in Canberra knows the Treasury made a recommendation,’’ Turnbull sad.

“It was $18 a week, which was lower than the ACTU’s recommendation although higher than the business groups had recommended. And Kevin Rudd doesn’t have the compassion, he doesn’t have the courage, he doesn’t have the integrity to make any recommendation to the Fair Pay Commission.”

No, said Treasury boss Henry, in an unusual break with keeping his public silence on such issues.

``I refer to recent claims that the Treasury recommended to the Government that it nominate a specific dollar figure in the Government’s submission to the Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC) on minimum wages,’’ Henry said in a statement.

``These claims are false.

``Rather, the Treasury recommended that the Australian government submission to the AFPC support an increase in minimum wages without recommending a specific quantum of minimum wage increase.’’

Earlier, someone had helpfully released selected excerpts of the Treasury advice, repudiating Turnbull’s claims about the cabinet submission on the minimum wage increase to Sky News.

Turnbull argued that if the Government wanted to argue the case, it should release the advice in full.

But the fun wasn’t over for the day, with Reserve Bank governor Stevens also releasing a copy of a speech he made on Wednesday that tackles head-on Turnbull’s claims – and others – that the inflation problem isn’t that much of a problem and that interest rates could be the wrong tool alone to tackle the problem.
“One argument which has been around is that there isn’t much inflation,’’ he said.

“On the face of it, this is not an unreasonable starting point. The latest CPI headline rate is, after all, only 3 per cent. If that is as high as it gets and it comes down at some point before long, then presumably there is not that much of a problem. It would, in fact, be quite consistent with the inflation targeting framework we have been operating on for well over a decade now. The average inflation rate over a run of years would still be ‘two point something’.

“Unfortunately, the situation at present is not quite as benign as that. The headline figure owes quite a bit to the unusually low result in the March quarter of 2007, which was affected by some unusual and temporary effects. When we get the March 2008 figures towards the end of April, we will most likely find that the rise over the four quarters is more like 4 per cent.

“So accepting a rise in trend inflation because of the short term moderation in demand growth needed to contain a pick up in prices would be a very short sighted policy. It would very likely condemn us to a repeat of the problems of the late 1960s and 1970s, when we mistakenly thought we could live with a bit more inflation, and all the attendant difficulty we had in the 1980s in fixing the inflation problem, all over again. It is far better to resist rising inflation now.”

Turnbull is a big player, with big ideas, who has a big future in politics. But there are some other big boys in the economic sandpit, and today two of them – Henry and Stevens – taught him a lesson.

Over to you…


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Saturday, January 19, 2008

Neoliberalism Comes Unglued


By Mark Weisbrot
With the stock market plummeting, an economic and political crisis in Russia, and a regional depression in Asia, a lot of people are wondering if we are staring into the abyss. It's no longer just the left, which has predicted six out of the last three world economic crises, that is nervous. "We are in a situation which is indeed a dangerous one, not fully rational," said IMF managing director Michel Camdessus. And Federal Reserve Board chair Alan Greenspan also warned that "it is just not credible that the United States can remain an oasis of prosperity unaffected by a world that is experiencing greatly increased stress."
The latter statement could be contested. The United States still consumes 88 percent of what it produces, and could, with the right policies, protect its population from adverse economic events in the rest of the world. As much as our political leaders would prefer to let the tail wag the dog--subordinate the domestic economy to the needs of international commerce--they are still a long way from transforming the U.S. economy where our fiscal or monetary policies are externally constrained. The dollar lost a third of its international value between 1985 and 1988, and this had no adverse effect on the U.S. economy. In other words, the Fed could lower interest rates as far as it wanted to, in order to keep the U.S. out of recession. Unlike most other nations, we would not have to worry about the inflationary impact of any currency depreciation that might result. We could also run federal budget deficits, if necessary, for the purpose of maintaining economic growth and employment.
It is important to keep this in mind, not because we are close to having a government that would put the needs of its people ahead of the big bondholders or transnational capital. But they should be held accountable, and not be able to shift the blame to nebulous unseen forces of "the global economy." Greenspan's announcement last week that he would consider lowering interest rates is a positive sign, but it remains to be seen whether the Fed's action will, as has happened in the past, end up being too little and too late.
The events that have dominated the headlines of the economic news are not as interrelated as they appear to be. To get a handle on what is happening, it is worth trying to sort them out a bit.

The Stock Market's Decline

The Dow is down about 16 percent since July 17, and this is commonly attributed to events in Russia and Asia. But this is very misleading. The fact is that stocks were, and still are, grossly overvalued relative to the earnings of the underlying assets they represent. When this happens, decline is inevitable, and the external event that triggers the decline does not "cause" it in any meaningful sense of the word.

It is not that difficult to show that stock prices have been inflated into a speculative bubble. Dean Baker of the Economic Policy Institute has done the necessary arithmetic, in the course of refuting the exaggerated claims--regarding potential stock market returns--made by those who seek to privatize Social Security.

Stock prices can bounce all over the place in the short run, as the market is driven by psychology. But ultimately stocks only have value because the companies they represent earn profits. People forget this sometimes, and then remember it when the market plunges--much as drivers in Washington DC seem to re-learn how to drive in the snow and ice each winter.

There are two sources of income from holding stocks: first, a dividend payout, which represents the shareholder's portion of the companies profits (earnings). The average dividend payout is currently about 2 percent. The other source of income is from an increase in the price of stocks or capital gains. The question is, how much can stock prices increase?

The average price to earnings ratio is still at a record high, even after the recent plunge. So it is safe to assume that prices will not increase faster than earnings. Earnings, however, cannot increase much faster than the growth of the economy--unless we think that there is going to be a continuous redistribution of income from labor to capital. Some of that has happened--the share of national income going to corporate profits has increased by 3.2 percentage points since the last business cycle peak (1989). The typical worker would be earning about $1,100 more annually today if not for that shift. But no one is projecting this trend to continue, and real wages for the majority of the work force have begun to rise significantly during the last two years.

So if stock prices cannot grow faster than earnings, and earnings cannot grow faster than the economy, then we would expect stock prices to grow at about the same rate as the economy. Over the next decade, economic growth is projected to be about 2 percent annually. If we add that to the dividend payout, we get a rate of return on stocks of 4 percent a year, maybe 4.5 percent if the economy grows a little faster.

So why would anyone hold stocks if they can get almost the same return on a short-term bond, with virtually no risk? Well, they might not have seen this arithmetic. If we look at who has done what in the last few market downturns, it has been overwhelmingly the small investors buying and the big players selling. But even for those who know they are sitting on a bubble, there is an enormous temptation to stay in as long you expect others to buy enough to keep driving prices up, so long as you can jump before everyone else does. But that's easier said than done, and of course most people won't be able to pull it off; such is the nature of bubbles, manias, and other excesses of markets generally.

All this analysis shows us is that the stock market's decline is not the result of events in faraway places. It is, however, a truly significant event that might well herald the end of an era in U.S. politics.

Here is the silver lining in the clouds looming over Wall Street: some of the regressive social engineering that took place over the last decade is about to come undone. Certainly the extension of these counter-reforms, in the form of privatizing Social Security, has been dealt a serious blow. The more class-conscious among the privatizers, such as Washington Post columnist James Glassman, have been fully cognizant of the political implications of replacing social insurance--which is not only many times more efficient than any private alternative, but also a solidaristic system with a different ethic--with millions of individual stock holders. They want people to identify with corporate profits, and to have policy makers increasingly constrained from doing anything that might upset the stock market.

The spread of stock ownership to 43 percent of households, many through 401 (k) and other retirement accounts, has coincided with a record run-up in stock prices. To be sure, this ownership is still highly concentrated, with the median household holding only about $14,000 in stocks. In fact, 86 percent of the stock market gains since 1989 have accrued to the top 10 percent of households.

But the idea has been popularized that stocks are the means by which the majority of people partake in the gains from economic growth. That idea will soon be as good as dead. A more sensible alternative can be found in the not-too-distant past, when the majority of Americans shared in the fruits of technological progress through rising wages and an expanding social safety net: e.g. Social Security (which was indexed to inflation in the 1970s), and expanded access to health care (Medicare and Medicaid, long overdue to be extended to the rest of the population). If progressives are able to frame the issue this way, they will likely find a receptive audience, now that the alternative of gambling one's life savings in the stock market has been exposed for what it is--gambling.

Globalization in Crisis

Neoliberalism at the global level has also been dealt some serious blows--although one of the hardest punches has not received the attention it deserves: Russia's default on $200 billion worth of debt, some $40 billion of which is owed to foreigners. Like the proverbial sewer smell arising in the midst of a dinner party, the guests--the international creditors--do not want to mention it. This is a first for the international system of debt peonage, and the idea could easily spread. Mozambique, one of the poorest countries in the world, is paying about a quarter of its export earnings for debt service, more than it spends on education and health care. Other desperately poor countries are similarly squeezed, and the threat of Russia's example is being taken very seriously.

The collapse of the ruble also has implications far beyond Russia's borders. The stabilization of the ruble had been the IMF's only accomplishment over the past six years. The ruble's collapse just weeks after the IMF had put up nearly $5 billion dollars to support it, which went right into the outstretched hands of speculators, has given the Fund another high profile black eye. The IMF's credibility crisis is internationally the most important aspect of neoliberalism's troubles right now, since the IMF is by far the most powerful instrument of transnational capital. Since the Fund inflicts more damage, in economic and human terms, than any other national or international institution, it is worth looking at the current fight over expanding the IMF in the context of the current international economic situation.

The spread of financial and economic turmoil has reminded people that unregulated markets are prone to crises, panics, overshooting, recessions and even depressions. At the level of the nation-state, a number of institutions have evolved which regulate, and sometimes prevent the worst excesses and irrationalities of a market system: even in the United States we have the Federal Reserve as a lender of last resort, Federal deposit insurance, and the automatic stabilizers of government spending, to name just a few examples. At the same time, and sometimes within the same institutions, the welfare state has softened the impact of these irrationalities and also mitigated the injustices that result from market outcomes.

The global economy has no analogous institutions, and transnational capital and its political allies have deliberately expanded its importance (through agreements like NAFTA, the GATT, and the MAI) for the purpose of avoiding the civilizing influences of the last century and a half of struggle. The process has been one of continually removing economic decision making from Parliaments, Congresses, and elected officials, and placing it in the hands of unaccountable institutions such as the IMF, WTO, G-7, etc.

For those who care about the human consequences of these developments, there is a strategic question that is becoming increasingly important: should we accede to the process of increasing global economic integration, and try to create the requisite quasi-state institutions at the international level? Or should we oppose it, with the hope that individual nation states will thus be able, to varying degrees, find their own regulatory mechanisms--whether they be national-developmentalist, social democratic, or even socialist?

In some cases it might be possible to do both--e.g., oppose the process and simultaneously fight for labor rights clauses in new international agreements. But in other cases our choices are much more limited, and it is crucial that we understand this limited range of choice.

The IMF is one such case, and the lack of clarity among the progressive community is hurting us. The recent troubles have amplified the voices of those among our elite who would support some greater international regulatory mechanisms--the U.S. Treasury Department calls it a "new architecture of the global economy." While not all of the measures they would consider are harmful, the expansion of the IMF's power that they propose would be an enormous step backward.

Many people who would ordinarily oppose economic colonialism are willing to acquiesce to, or even support the expansion of the IMF in the hope that it may someday be transformed into its opposite. This is a terrible mistake. The IMF is a brutal, colonial institution, controlled by Washington, an organizer of creditors that squeezes the world's poorest countries for debt service on loans they cannot ever hope to repay. It is also a de-regulatory institution, whose adopted mission is to open up the world's economies to transnational capital on the latter's terms. It has consistently wielded its enormous power against any industrial or even agricultural strategy that has been centered around national economic development. With the exception of the Mexican peso crisis, it has never functioned as a lender of last resort, as its recent failures in Indonesia and Russia have amply demonstrated.

This is not a question of reform versus abolition, as it is often posed. The IMF will indeed change its policies in response to criticism--as even dictators like Suharto did. In fact, it already has, allowing Indonesia to increase its budget deficit target from 1 percent to 8.5 percent of GDP. But it will not be reformed into anything that can have a net positive impact, if for no other reason than it is unaccountable to any population anywhere. And it will not be abolished any time soon.

The idea that we can create international institutions, controlled by the governments of the world's richest countries, that would somehow reverse the policies that these governments are pursuing, has always seemed far-fetched to me. It would make more sense to first change the foreign economic policy of the United States, where at least we can vote, before expanding its power over the poorer countries of the world.

The need for clarity on these questions is important, as the Clinton administration is asking for $18.5 billion to expand the IMF's capital base by 45 percent (with the contributions of other members, who will likely follow the U.S. lead). With every tremor in the international economy, as well as the stock market, the Administration has exhorted Congress to approve the money or risk being blamed for the next disaster. Most Democrats have gone along from the beginning, with only a handful--along with the large majority of Republicans--holding it up. After the latest IMF-sponsored fiasco in Russia, House Appropriations chair Bob Livingston, the Administration's key Republican ally, announced he was reconsidering his support, and Newt Gingrich made similar noises.

Neoliberalism will of course survive with a much weakened and discredited IMF, but its backers are aware how much more difficult it is to force countries like South Korea to accept mass layoffs or remove its remaining controls on foreign capital and ownership, as the IMF has recently arranged, if the orders were coming directly from Washington or a handful of private foreign banks. The neoliberals understand the importance of this battle; unfortunately, many on our side do not.

Cracks in the Wall

It is understandable that many people could be carried away by the prospect of global economic reform. There has been a significant shift in the public debate over the last year, and even the last few months. A number of prominent, pro-globalization, mainstream economists have come out in favor of increased capital controls. Joseph Stiglitz, chief economist of the World Bank and former chair of President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisors, breached protocol by openly accusing the IMF of exacerbating the Asian financial crisis. Columbia University's Jagdish Bhagwhati, one of the world's most prominent international economists and the Economic Policy Adviser to the Director-General of GATT (1991-93), has noted that "the Asian crisis cannot be separated from the excessive borrowings of foreign short-term capital as Asian economies loosened up their capital account controls and enabled their banks and firms to borrow abroad. . . it has become apparent that crises attendant on capital mobility cannot be ignored." Jeffrey Sachs and Steve Radelet of the Harvard Institute of International Development have reached similar conclusions in some well-researched papers on the Asian financial crisis, and Sachs has had some harsh words for the IMF, calling it "the Typhoid Mary of emerging markets, spreading recessions in country after country." The most radical break with neoclassical orthodoxy has come from no less a champion of globalization than Paul Krugman, who, writing in a recent article for Fortune magazine, proposed a return to restrictions on the convertibility of currencies. The latter policy was promptly adopted by Malaysia last week.

These epiphanies by prominent economists are long overdue, and recent events have provided an opportunity to blurt out the obvious. China has notably been the least affected by the Asian crisis, and certain reasons for its relative immunity seem clear: their currency is not convertible, they have little foreign ownership in financial markets, and their banking system is government-owned. Being free from IMF orthodoxy has its advantages: in response to the crisis, China announced last March a three year, $1 trillion public works program (the equivalent in the U.S., if you can imagine it, would be more than $8.5 trillion). How much and how it is actually implemented remains to be seen, but any expansionary policy makes a lot more sense than the beggar-thy-neighbor process of trying to export your unemployment by means of an undervalued currency--the latter is a zero-sum game.

Krugman's policy of foreign exchange controls makes sense, too, and Russia appears to be the next candidate for adopting it, unless the IMF can stop them. Look at the alternative: Mexico is jacking up interest rates to 38 percent in order to stem the capital flight, currency collapse, resultant inflation, and possible economic disaster that has threatened them because of…Russia--country that has nothing to do with them. The irrationality of international financial markets has reached new extremes, as one poor country after another is trampled by the herd behavior of investors who may know nothing more than the fact that other investors might be averse to "emerging markets" after the last disaster.

The human cost of this irrationality has been staggering, especially in Asia. Years of economic and social progress are being negated, as the unemployed vie for jobs in sweatshops that they would have previously rejected, and the rural poor subsist on leaves, bark, and insects. In Indonesia, the majority of families now have a monthly income less than the amount that they would need to buy a subsistence quantity of rice, and nearly 100 million people--half the population--are being pushed below the poverty line. Women have been particularly hard hit: they are first to be laid off, have taken sharper cuts in access to food and other necessities, and girls are being pulled from school to help with their families' survival.

How much of this misery is directly due to neoliberal policies and their supporting institutions? It appears to be quite a bit. The short-term debt build-up that preceded the Asian financial crisis clearly created the instability that turned the fall of the Thai baht in July 1997 into a regional financial meltdown. This rapid accumulation of short-term debt, in turn, was a direct result of the removal of capital controls--at the insistence of the United States. For example, South Korean, Thai, and Indonesian banks (as well as non-financial corporations) were allowed, in the last six years, to borrow from international markets with fewer restrictions then ever before. Since the burden of foreign debt service increases when the domestic currency falls, this left these economies extremely vulnerable to a panic, and the ensuing vicious spiral of currency depreciation.

What was needed at the onset of the crisis was a supply of foreign exchange reserves to assure investors that they did not have to flee the country today in order to avoid further foreign exchange losses tomorrow. The government of Japan actually proposed, at a meeting of regional finance ministers in September 1997, that an Asian Monetary Fund be created in order to provide liquidity to the faltering economies, and with fewer of the conditions imposed by the IMF. This fund was to have been endowed with as much as $100 billion in emergency resources, which would come not only from Japan, but from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and other countries, all of whom supported the proposal.

After strenuous opposition from the U.S. Treasury Department, which insisted that the IMF must determine the conditions of any bailout before any other funds were committed, the plan was dropped by November. It is impossible to tell how things might have turned out differently, but it is certainly conceivable that not only the depression, but even the worst of the currency collapses could have been avoided if the fund had been assembled and deployed quickly at that time.

The IMF then failed to provide the necessary reserves--Indonesia had received only $3 billion by March 1998. Even worse, the IMF's insistence on very high interest rates, as well as fiscal austerity, worsened the contraction of the injured economies. The result was that a liquidity crisis, which could have been managed and limited to the financial sphere of the economy, became a major regional depression.

Less noticed has been Washington's contribution to Russia's economic disaster. Most Americans are unaware of it, but the Russian economy had already collapsed long before the recent unhinging of the ruble and default on government debt. Over the last six years, American economists--together with the International Monetary Fund--have presided over one of the worst economic declines in modern history.

Russian output has declined by more than 40 percent since 1992--a catastrophe worse than our own Great Depression. Millions of workers are not being paid and most economic transactions now take place through barter. The majority of the population has fallen into poverty. Death rates have risen sharply and the decline in male life expectancy--from a pre-reform 65.5 years to 57 years today--is unprecedented in peacetime, in the absence of a natural disaster. All of this happened before the current meltdown.

The failures of neoliberalism are getting harder to ignore, even for its defenders. Its global component had already suffered a significant defeat last year, as the president's quest for fast-track authority--to negotiate new trade and commercial agreements without amendments from Congress--was blocked. Opposition to IMF expansion has also thrown a wrench in their machinery. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, a treaty that would extend the investment provisions of NAFTA to the 29 mostly high-income countries of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), and then to the rest of the world, has also been slowed down by worldwide opposition.

Nonetheless we are only beginning to crack the structure of neoliberal ideology in the United States. Although the debate within the economics profession has received a bit of coverage in the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, most reporting--whether through print or electronic media--remains unaffected by it. The airwaves are saturated with blather about "crony capitalism" as the cause of Asia's troubles, and we are daily reminded that Russia needs to be forced to follow the West's "reform" program more diligently. Unlike the stock market, which directly affects some millions of people's lives and forces them to think about their future, foreign economic policy remains in the mystified realm of the experts and officials. The foreign policy establishment has made no concessions, and is not planning to make any. The Clinton administration is forging ahead with plans to complete the MAI negotiations this fall.

Washington is a still a long way from changing its course, but its ability to impose its neoliberal dogma on the rest of the world is waning. And that, by itself, is cause for hope.

Mark Weisbrot is Research Director at the Preamble Center, in Washington, DC (www.preamble.org).



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Free Trade for Whom?


Kristin Dawkins is director of the Trade and Agriculture Program at the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy in Minneapolis. She directs the Institute’s work on ecological economics and the links between trade and environmental policy. She came to the Institute from Harvard Law School Program in Negotiation, where she was Senior Writer for the publication Consensus. From 1973 to 1989 she worked in community development in Philadelphia, where she served as the Executive Director of the Phila­delphia Jobs and Energy Project. She is the author of Gene Wars: The Politics of Biotechnology.
BARSAMIAN: You write, “The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, known as GATT, and the creation of the World Trade Organization, WTO, have elevated concerns about the impacts of global trade rules on rural and urban communities, family farmers, consumers, indigenous peoples, the environment, demo­cracy, and human rights.” You want to delineate a little bit?
DAWKIN: In general, the objective of globalization, particularly as it is being driven by trade policy, is the commercialization of everything. The marketplace determines societal decisions. Its goal is to have corporate wealth as the measure of human welfare. This is the general problem that the Uruguay Round and its 28 different trade agreements is exacerbating. Each one of the constituencies you listed is affected somewhat differently by one or more of the 28 agreements, according to the part they play in the general economy and the changes that are driving the way they can or can’t make money in a global economy.

I’m interested that you mention “democracy” and “human rights” as a constituency.

There are constituencies trying to reinforce democracy and human rights as alternative frameworks for global policy. The United Nations and its agencies are not perfectly demo­cratic, but at least all of the governments of the world do have a vote. On the other hand, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund are the three institutions spearheading globalization, often referred to as the Bretton Woods group. This group is not driven by a voting procedure in which all governments have a voice or a vote. It is driven by a voting procedure based on the dollar. The wealthy countries that invest money in those organizations get to make the decisions. The poorer nations of the world, who are generally the recipients of the policy and the actual financial aid, have no voice in the decisions that are made.

Bretton Woods is in New Hampshire. In 1944 it was the site of a big power economic summit to shape the postwar economic world.

It was part of the general movement towards the Marshall Plan. After the war, the very highly industrialized U.S. economy no longer had war production to fuel the economy, and so they were trying to convert to a peacetime agenda. That peacetime agenda was essentially to rebuild Europe. So they embarked on a series of institutional design questions, created the World Bank, the IMF, and what was the GATT up until very recently. It’s been converted into the WTO. In so doing, they poured a lot of money into construction of harbors, shipping, transport, railroads, and factory development. All of that was designed to subsidize the reconstruction of Europe. Once Europe was reconstructed, however, things really changed. It became a competitor. The industrial sectors of Europe and the U.S. began to compete with each other and to compete for foreign markets in the developing world. As a result, over time there’s been a switch in the policies that these three Bretton Woods institutions embrace. These policies are now designed to move the industrialized production system into the Third World, exploit the resources and the labor of the Third World, and make those cheaper imports available to a globalized economy that is supposedly more efficient, but definitely more profitable for the transnational corporations.

Perhaps some people are stuck in the quagmire of acronyms that surround trade issues. We’ve already mentioned GATT and the WTO. Then there are NAFTA and MAI and terms like fast track. Could you sort these out?

GATT is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. At the time, the Bretton Woods negotiators were really designing something they called the International Trade Organization. Reading those original documents, one sees a number of principles that might be considered valid and important to implement at the international level, such as antitrust regulation and fair pricing for trade and international commodities. These parts of the International Trade Organization, however, did not get implemented into international law, precisely because the Truman administration at that time was having a number of partisan disputes with Congress. The only piece able to emerge from the congressional process was the one segment of the International Trade Organization that dealt with commercial trade. So only commercial trade was regulated, and in those days the regulations were primarily promotion of trade in order to re-stimulate investments in Europe. To this day they remain a promotion of trade more than a regulation of trade.

A number of the regulations that are emerging from the last couple of rounds of trade negotiations, in particular the Uruguay Round, which was finished in 1994, require governments to undo laws that had been made at the national level through processes of citizen participation, through Congresses or Parliaments, as the case may be. According to the WTO, which is the new World Trade Organization created by the Uruguay Round to enforce the new trade regime, many existing national laws need to be either changed in order to conform with international trade law or a country has to pay a penalty if they prefer to keep what has been their democratically derived national legislation.

NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement, passed Congress by a narrow vote.

In 1993, Congress voted in favor of NAFTA, 234-200. The vote was close because of well organized campaigning against the kind of free trade the U.S. promotes on behalf of corporations. Canadians can talk at great length about the changes in their economy, none for the better, that the 1989 Free Trade Agreement with the U.S. started up there. Then free trade promoters took a number of those principles, applied them to Mexico, and added another couple of layers. Free trade means that corporations are allowed to send goods back and forth across borders, regardless of a number of policies that at the border used to be considered legitimate protection for the citizenry. Take, for example, the inspection of meats. One of the provisions of NAFTA was that the meat industry should be allowed to ship meat back and forth across the border with minimal inspection standards.

In the summer of 1997, there was the largest recall of meat in U.S. history.

There are more and more scares every day. I just read that the average American has one stomach upset per year as a result of eating food. There is a general decline in food safety standards. Meat inspections are way down. So, too, are pesticide standards, so that the amount of toxic residue on the fruits and vegetables that we get at the store is often higher than in the past. All of this is in the interest of promoting trade and commerce, not in the interest of protecting the public.

When the U.S., which is the prime mover behind these free trade pacts, crafts them, they are structured as agreements rather than treaties. Why that distinction?

This gets us to fast track. Under our Constitution, the Senate has the obligation to determine what international treaties become national law. It requires a vote of two-thirds of the Senate for an international treaty to be implemented as part of U.S. law. The two-thirds requirement is fairly stiff. In order to evade that particular requirement, which I would say is a highly democratic provision, the White House, going back a good 20 years, has used what is called the fast track process and changed the classification from treaties to executive agree­ments requiring just a 51 percent majority vote of the House or Senate. They claim that it’s difficult to reach a balance with a number of issues having been bargained back and forth to reach some kind of optimal agreement among many countries. In order to preserve this delicate balance, the White House prefers to eliminate through fast track the right and obligation of the Congress to approve them as treaties. Instead they’re obliged to vote on the entire package as a simple agreement with a majority vote, up or down, one vote each for the whole package. No debate and no consideration of the different issues.

The advocates of free trade argue that the world is becoming a global village and we are interdependent economically, and that’s a good thing. So, for example, you can get a batik sarong from Indonesia in Minneapolis or you can buy bas­mati rice from India in Boulder, Colorado. In return, people in those countries can get a Madonna video, a Michael Jackson CD, or Nike Air Jordans.

The joys of modern progress. There are definitely some advantages to trade. I drink coffee. I drink orange juice. Those things aren’t grown in Minnesota where I live, so it is a privilege that I have as a citizen of the global economy to be able to consume these products daily. But on the other hand, the premise that trade generates wealth for all is a bogus argument.

Tetteh Hormeku of the Third World Network in Penang, Malaysia, in an article in Third World Resurgence magazine, writes that U.S. trade policy in Africa is “intervention by other means.... President Clinton’s offer at the Denver G-7 summit in June of 1997 to expand trade to Africa is not designed to build the continent’s economic capacities. Rather the move is part of a multi-pronged attempt to promote U.S. corporate interests in Africa.”

First let me explain the MAI which you asked about earlier. The MAI, the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, is the latest and greatest effort by the transnational corporations to completely eliminate any regulations that nation-states may have created to try to make sure that there is some degree of trickle-down. An investor comes into a country, let’s say Zimbabwe, and sets up shop, develops an enterprise, makes some money, and ships that money back home to a bank in New York or Switzerland or offshore. The Zimbabweans may have established some rules governing foreign investors to ensure that some percentage of the value of what that enterprise makes is reinvested in the local economy before the profits are taken out of the country: performance requirements that an investor has to either hire locally or use locally manufactured inputs, for example. The draft MAI is a set of rules for governments requiring them to free investors from the kinds of development policies that I’m mentioning. As a further violation of democratic principles, the MAI is being negotiated not at the global level, but in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which is the grouping of 29 or so of the richest countries in the world, the industrialized nations’ club, as it’s sometimes called.

If the MAI is eventually approved by these 29 rich countries, then, the draft rules say, other poorer countries can join in, without having had any access to the negotiations. Africa is considered a very interesting new market, not so much for the sale of products but for investors as a source of new raw materials for production and cheap labor, of course. So the Clinton administration is looking at a way to get a head start over the rest of the world in setting up shop for U.S.-based transnationals to penetrate that African market. There is a bill in Congress that would basically set up a NAFTA-style arrangement with African countries, but it goes even farther than NAFTA in that it applies a number of the same conditions that go along with the so-called structural adjustment process. These are conditions required of indebted governments by the IMF and World Bank to restructure their economies so that, theoretically, they will pay off their debt as the top priority. One of the conditions is currency devalution. Suppose that on one day you had $10,000 in the bank and suddenly your currency is devalued, let’s say, 50 percent; that means the next day you only have $5,000. So for holders of money, devaluing can be a terrible problem. For people, however, who are exporting, it means that the price of their goods goes down by half. The sudden cheaper price in the world marketplace means that they get a step up against their competitors. So suddenly you see the demand for those products increasing. Only half of the original value in foreign exchange is coming into their economy, but they’re selling a whole lot more stuff. The foreign exchange gets banked, and enables the country to make a debt payment. This result is good for the traders themselves and the creditors, but bad for the nations and very bad for the general population. Currency devaluation is one of the conditions attached to structural adjustment policies in general and the Africa trade bill in particular.

Structural adjustment also encompasses privatization of the public sector and shredding of the social safety net.

Those are other conditions that are a general part of structural adjustment policies and the African trade bill. They are designed to take as much of the cash that is within an economy as possible, extract it from the local system, and get it into the big banks that are presently owed money through a lot of financial mismanagement over past decades. By privatizing government services, such as agricultural marketing boards or electricity and telephone services, governmental expenditures go down so more revenues can go into debt payments. By cutting back on health and education and other social services, more government revenues can go into debt payments. The whole purpose is to extract public wealth for the banking system.

The Clintonites and those who preceded them argue that free trade is essential for the future economic well-being and growth of the U.S. They liken it to a form of national security. They say that the U.S. must remain competitive in an increasingly tough global economy. The mantra of jobs, jobs, jobs is intoned by Clinton and treasury and trade officials.

This is deeply cynical. The jobs that one can point to as a result of the free trade agreements are in general a matter of lost jobs. The actual econometric evaluation of NAFTA, for example, looks at something like 420,000 jobs lost out of the U.S. economy as a result of the changes in our trading patterns. The idea that free trade generates jobs is really hard for the proponents to prove. One of the economists that they cite most often, who was with the Institute for International Economics, admitted one year after NAFTA was in place that he had been wrong and that all of his own projections had been incorrect. The economy, however, of the transnational corporations has been boosted by these agreements. It’s easy to look at their bottom lines and see tremendous increases in sales as they’ve taken advantage of new markets in other countries, markets that were essentially stolen from national capital and small, local producers in the rest of the world.

In the context of the Asian economic meltdown, the International Monetary Fund has come under rather widespread criticism for the first time from economists like Jeffrey Sachs and Paul Krugman for some of its lending and bailout policies.

It’s good to see, finally. The original goals of the IMF was for it to act as a stabilizer of last resort. So that at a much smaller scale, if this kind of a phenomenon had occurred in the 1940s and the 1950s, the theory was that the IMF would have the ability to take some of its money and invest it in that suddenly shaky economy and thus keep the amount of cash available to that system somewhat stable and therefore functional. The result, however, of the last few decades of IMF policy has been virtually the reverse. They are still a lender of last resort but only after a country is in a lot of economic trouble, and the conditions attached to those loans make things worse: devaluations, the privatization of much of the fundamental infrastructure in a country, and the extraction of every available public dollar to pay back those earlier debts. With new loans being used to pay off old loans, as Fidel Castro has pointed out, the debt is in many cases actually mathematically impossible to pay off with the kind of production systems that drive those economies; that is, the debts and compounded interest are so great that repayment can never be achieved. A private debtor would go bankrupt, but a country cannot close its doors. This is what we’re seeing in much of Africa and in other parts of the Third World, where the debt has grown proportionately over many years. The IMF has loaned over and over again to keep some degree of fluidity in these economies, but without fogiving the debt. So as the debt mounts and mounts, an economy finally becomes prostrate before international policy. That’s when the conditions swing in. Under IMF-imposed structural adjustment regimes, gov­ernments are forced to eliminate health, safety, education, and food assistance subsidies.

The U.S. is the largest constituent member in the IMF and clearly calls the shots within that organization. Does that one dollar of taxpayer-supported money from the U.S. go to the IMF, then to Indonesia, and come back to pay off a New York bank? Is that fairly accurate?

It is, more or less. This bailout that is being talked about in Congress right now, and is the top foreign policy priority of the Clinton administration, is designed to do essentially that. The taxpayers’ money would be given to the IMF. The IMF would then lend it to the banking system, the national treasury in these countries. They would use the treasury of that country, and therefore the credit-worthiness of the people of that country, to help buy out the bankrupt companies in that country, as well as to give additional fluidity to those handful of companies that have managed to stay afloat. Those companies that have gone bankrupt, oftentimes their creditors are the banks in New York. So under normal bankruptcy proceeding, there is the list of creditors who get paid off first and foremost. They tend to be the big banking names like Chase Manhattan and Citibank. Those guys then become the ultimate recipients of the bailout process.

You use the term biopiracy.” What is it?

The normal kind of piracy that we’re all familiar with is when a ship on the high seas back in the 1700s would plunder another ship and loot it. In modern times the plunderers are going into wilderness areas in the Third World, the Amazon, some of the Asian and African tropical belts, and plundering the genetic resources, which are very prolific in these tropical zones. Modern biopirates are scientists, anthropologists, botanists, people with that kind of training who know how to approach a tribal community or a forest-dwelling community in the tropical forests and find out from their shamans, their medicine people, their leaders what their use of some of the local plants may be. If you look at our modern medicine, some 90 percent of the medications that are prescribed have their active ingredient derived from plants. These traditional medicine healers have scientific knowledge. The anthropologists go into villages, find out about useful plants, take them back to the laboratories in the U.S. or Europe, develop a new medicine from that knowledge, patent that medicine with a 20-year monopoly on any use of that knowledge for that one company to profit from. This is biopiracy.

For example, the aloe plant. It has healing properties for cuts and burns. Are you saying that a corporation will have an absolute patent right on that and if you were living in Costa Rica you could not go into the forest and pick an aloe leaf and use it?

The police aren’t lurking behind every aloe plant throughout the planet. In most cases people will still go out and pick the leaf and use it. But where there’s a real profit to be made, the private police of that company are monitoring these kinds of activities. The case I’d like to mention is a practice that used to be very common in the U.S. and is still common throughout the rest of the world, and that is for farmers to re-use seeds. They plant a seed and it grows a crop and they select from that crop some of the better seed and then use it next year for the next planting season. But now that they are patenting seeds companies are finding that some farmers are going ahead and re-planting these patented seeds anyway, contrary to the terms of the contract that the farmers sign when they buy it, the companies are actually penalizing those farmers. You would think seeds are common and available. But when there is a tremendous market to be kept for the private use of one company, they will send the police out. Farmers in the U.S. have been fined and, in some cases, their crops have been burned as a penalty for re-planting patented seeds.

You talk about some case studies in India, three in particular, neem, basmati rice, and turmeric.

The basmati case is the most recent. In late 1997, Ricetec, which is a U.S.-based company, went to the Patent and Trademark Office of the U.S. government to file for a patent on basmati. The result means that they are the only company in the world allowed to use the name “basmati” on a commercially sold package of rice. In the northern region that straddles India and Pakistan, basmati rice has been produced for hundreds if not thousands of years. It is a special form of rice that is particularly sweet, aromatic, and very popular. This means that Indian farmers, who developed this rice, who made it sweet and aromatic through cross-breeding and selection processes, are no longer able to market the rice from the original region as long as Ricetech owns the patent and can monopolize use of that name.

The same with the neem. Neem is a tree that grows everywhere in India. It happens to have properties that are insecticidal and antibacterial. People go out in their backyards and pick a few leaves and use them to brush their teeth with, to wash their clothes with, to delouse with if they’re having a problem with lice. The W.R. Grace & Company took the neem seed and, through a number of laboratory processes, developed a certain pesticidal extract and patent­ed its manufacturing process. All together, more than a dozen U.S. patents have been taken out by various companies on uses of the neem. The patents don’t mean an Indian can’t use the tree. The neem police aren’t watching every backyard. But they do prevent Indians from competing in the commercial world using a plant that is from India. It’s W.R. Grace and the other patent-holders’ right to commercialize neem in any capacity whatsoever for 20 years.

Turmeric is used in cooking and it helps in healing as well. There was a patent applied for in the U.S. which declared all commercial uses of turmeric would belong to the company. This one was successfully challenged by the Indian government, which is very likely to challenge the basmati patent, too. In the case of turmeric, after a good deal of publicity, the company was forced by the U.S. to withdraw its patent.

Today three giant corporations dominate agri­culture, Con­Agra, Continental Grain, and Archer Daniels Midland. The latter, which calls itself “supermarket to the world,” is a major sponsor of National Public Radio and PBS. It was con­victed of price-fixing on the international grain market and fined $100 million, the largest amount in history. What kind of impact do those three corporations have on U.S. agriculture?

What we see in rural America is the result of a couple of decades of this process in which agribusiness has been lobbying for low farm prices—cheap raw materials for their industry. During the 1980s, the combination of low farm prices and high interest rates forced many farmers to go bankrupt. The number of family farmers today is roughly about a million, down from something like six to eight million a couple of decades ago, while the agribusiness conglomerates have expanded by leaps and bounds. This corporate windfall is structured in a very clever fashion. Every five years, the U.S. government produces something that they call “the farm bill.” If you look back five years at a time, you find a very steady lowering of the legislated “target price.” This is the price farmers get paid and, since the 1950s, it’s been less than their costs of production. The farm bill then offers a taxpayer subsidy of the difference between this low target price and what the private sector, the companies that you mentioned, offer in the market. Thanks to this insulation by taxpayers, the big companies have gradually been able to offer a lower and lower market price. The taxpayers’ contribution, up to a legislated target price, still fails to bring the value that the farmer makes up to the actual cost that the farm entails when it puts a crop into the ground. That difference, for many years around 25 percent of real costs, is what led to the bankruptcies of the 1980s. Now we’re seeing another wave of farm bankruptcies, as the most recent farm bill eliminated government support for farmers’ income altogether.

Again, within the context of really existing capitalism, Archer Daniels Midland is one of the largest recipients of corporate welfare. This has been documented by Public Citizen and United for a Fair Economy.

This is absolutely true. Yet they go ahead and do their price-fixing and their market allocations with their subsidiaries in other countries around the world. The case that they got caught for had to do with a byproduct of the grains themselves, but they were colluding with Japanese subsidiaries to affect the international market for this lysine product as well.

Where’s the USDA in all this?

ADM, the “supermarket to the world,” was caught and fined a record-breaking $100 million. But compared to the $15 billion in sales ADM expects to make this year, it’s not enough to eliminate this kind of rogue marketing. There’s something like a couple thousand complaints of various sorts of antitrust violations that the U.S. government fields every year. They are only able to investigate something like a few hundred of those. Those few hundred end up getting mired in enormous bureaucratic procedures, otherwise we would hear about more ADM-type scandals. But this is the nature of antitrust enforcement in the government today. Not to end pessimistically, I’d say the average American is getting more and more skeptical about corporate welfare, while internationally there is a lot of resistance to U.S. policy as it is being advanced by the Bretton Woods Institutions. Campaigns at the WTO this year are focusing on food safety, meat inspections, and genetically engineered foods. Next year, we’ll see fights at the WTO over whether Monsanto and Novartis should be allowed monopoly patents on life and how to stop biopiracy, with Africa leading the opposition. International organizing isn’t very well reported in the news media, but there’s plenty going on.

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Capitalism In Crisis?


The current economic crisis involves a series of “falling dominoes.” Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and by the time you read this perhaps Brazil, and more, are undergoing severe recessions. The toppling economies are big news because rather than only the poor suffering this time those of ample means are suffering too. Indeed, if the value of stocks declined while other prices and wages went unchanged and economic activity proceeded unabated, only those owning stocks would lose, and the share of total wealth in elite hands would decline. If your house doesn’t change in value and your wage doesn’t fall and your job doesn’t disappear, but Bill Gate’s stock drops, you improve relative to him. That kind of revaluation would be redistributive and we could legitimately celebrate it. Regrettably, however, the current crises go beyond just revaluing stocks to also afflict the poor with devastating unemployment, horrible wage reductions, unexpected foreclosures, life threatening food and goods shortages, and even increased starvation and disease. For growing numbers, these are the worst of times.
After World War Two, following the lead of the U.S. and Britain, the Bretton Woods system was established for international economic coordination. It utilized new institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF and had two basic principles. (1) Liberalize trade of goods, making it easy to transact. (2) Manage capital flow, making it hard for capital investment to leap from country to country without attention to consequences. It was understood that capitalist economies running full steam ahead with no oversight of their machinations, would yield horrible by-products not only for the poor, but for the rich as well. Bretton Woods limited short-run plunges for profit to preserve long-run profit possibilities.

There were two important observations behind all this. First, investors being able to move their monies where and when they please would lead to fluctuations in the relative value of currencies and other dislocations undermining trade and investment—in worst case scenarios inducing recession or even depression. Second, the free flow of capital would undermine democracy and the welfare state. Capital controls, ala Bretton Woods, not only guard against dislocation and crisis, but also allow governments to carry out monetary and tax policies, unemployment benefits, and social programs, and maintain public goods, all without fear of capital flight, which would, if allowed, limit such behavior. To foreshadow, it isn’t hard to guess the punch-line of our story. When capitalists got firmly in the saddle after beating back post World War II advocates of social democracy, in their zeal to eliminate the social protections afforded by Bretton Woods, they also eliminated its economic guards against financial crises.
The Bretton Woods system operated as intended for about a quarter century engendering the golden age of capitalism through the 1950s and 1960s. Then capitalists began to thirst anew for untrammeled profitability. On their behalf, Nixon unilaterally abrogated Bretton Woods in the early 1970s. By the 1980s capital controls were mostly gone in rich countries with the smaller economies like South Korea dropping them in turn. Now the IMF no longer regulates capital flows, but instead systematically forces countries to eliminate restrictions on international investment as a condition of bailouts.
And what has been the result? In rich countries, growth of productivity has slowed. Incomes have stagnated or declined for the great majority, conditions at work have deteriorated. social services have been gutted, infrastructure has decayed, and the welfare state has been eroded. At the top of the heap, in the U.S., the top one per cent of households own about half the stock and other assets that have increased in value, and the top 10 per cent own most of the rest. They are the ones enjoying the elimination of Bretton Woods. The next 10 per cent, the 80th to the 90th percentile has seen their net worth decline in the 1990s. And it gets worse as you go down, with few families maintaining their living standards of 1973--when the new economy really began to take hold, and many falling behind. In poor countries, the same has occurred, but worse.
Why would anyone favor such outcomes in place of the economic growth and social stability of Bretton Woods? Growth isn’t what capitalists seek. Capitalists seek profits. And throughout the post Bretton Woods period profits have soared, particularly in the 1990s. Indeed, the current jitters on Wall Street have nothing to do with the plight of the poor, which is simply not part of Wall Street’s agenda, but only involve fears that there may be an end to their post-Bretton Woods stupendous growth in profits. In short, the 25 years post-Bretton Woods have been a disaster for humanity, but a joyous fairy tale for the rich.
The reason for the fairy tale for the rich is frankly explained by the all-powerful Allan Greenspan. He fingers significant wage restraint and greater worker insecurity. That is, eliminating Bretton Woods and thereby allowing capital flight to undercut social support systems zapped labor big time. The Clinton administration attributes high profits to salutary changes in labor market institutions, which is a delicate way of saying the same thing. The business press points out that workers are too intimidated to seek some share in the good times. Business Week recently reported that 60 percent of workers are very concerned about job security and 30 percent somewhat concerned. When 90 percent of the work force is insecure, that's a fairy tale economy for the rich.
So the bottom line is that we have accelerating untrammeled profit-seeking for the few with derivative reduction of the well being of the many, and, alongside that, increasing destabilization, finally threatening even the rich. Digging economies out of recessions certainly benefits the poor. Nonetheless, for radicals to spend their time telling elites how to return to saner profit-seeking has a potential downside. It can turn radicals into doctors of capitalism—not educating and acting to raise anti-capitalist sentiment and commitment, but giving the impression that while a “sick capitalism” is horrible, a “healthy capitalism” is fine. Radicals shouldn’t ignore the current crisis or entirely forego thinking about policies to correct the travail it imposes. Instead while we act to ameliorate immediate suffering, we should also act in ways that lead beyond capitalist ideology and institutions. If we propose an end to the IMF and World Bank, we should also indicate what equitable international economic exchange ought to look like and what kinds of institutions can safeguard it. A movement to end the IMF and World Bank has to lead to a movement for better institutions in their place. When we decry the dislocations of crisis, we need to explain what structural changes will attain true justice (not just less extreme injustice): how workplaces must be reorganized, how remuneration should be determined, how allocation should transpire. We need to oppose sick capitalism in a way that opposes healthy capitalism too, and we need to favor immediate reforms not as ends in themselves, but in a way that fosters ever more changes and ultimately a whole new economic system.


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